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THE	  REGULATION	  OF	  CONTENT:	  INTRODUCTORY	  REMARKS	  
The	  regulation	  of	  content	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  self-­‐contained	  domain	  of	  governance,	  which	  was	  in	  
most	   aspects	   reserved	   for	   the	   nation	   state.	   Now	   many	   other	   domains	   have	   become	  
relevant,	   in	  more	  or	  less	   immediate	  ways.	  The	  linkages	  have	  only	  grown	  stronger	  as	  media	  
consumption	   has	   moved	   from	   old	   to	   new	   media	   and	   the	   latter	   have	   become	   deeply	  
integrated	   in	  everyday	  economic,	  cultural,	  political	  and	  social	   life.	  Next	  to	  the	  difficulty	   for	  
regulators	  to	  grapple	  with	  new	  technologies,	  the	  governance	  challenge	  here	  stems	  from	  the	  
often	   strikingly	   different	   regulatory	   histories,	   rationales	   for	   intervention	   and	   institutional	  
structures	   of	   these	   previously	   separated	   policy	   domains,	   and	   renders	   regulatory	   design	  
appropriate	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  core	  public	  policy	  objectives	  extremely	  complex	  (Brown	  
and	  Marsden	  2013).	  A	  related	  phenomenon	  that	  can	  be	  observed	  is	  the	  growing	  ‘messiness’	  
of	   regulation,	   as	   it	   not	   only	   draws	   together	   horizontally	   different	   domains	   but	   is	   also	  
unevenly	   vertically	   spread	   along	   a	  multi-­‐layered	   structure	   that	  mobilizes	   various	   actors	   at	  
the	  local,	  national,	  regional	  and	  international	  levels.	  
The	  paper	  seeks	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  regulating	  Internet	  content	  
against	  this	  backdrop.	  To	  reduce	  the	  analytical	  complexity,	  it	  takes	  for	  granted	  the	  key	  public	  
interest	   rationales	   for	   content	   regulation,	   which	   have	   traditionally	   been	   motivated	   by	   a	  
number	   of	   concerns	   related	   to	   both	   the	   specific	   nature	   of	   the	  media	   and	  media	  markets,	  
and	  to	  the	  specific	  function	  they	  are	  entrusted	  to	  play	  in	  society.	  	  
Next	   to	   their	   fundamental	   role	   as	   sustaining	   the	   freedom	   of	   expression,	   as	   conceived	  
passively	  and	  actively,	  these	  include:	  
• Concerns	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   media	   content,	   particularly	   on	   children	   and	   other	  
‘vulnerable’	  individuals;	  
• Concerns	   about	   the	   capacity	   to	   use	   media	   for	   citizen	   formation	   and	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  national	  cultural	  identity;	  
• Concerns	   about	   public	   participation	   associated	   with	   the	   broadcasting	   spectrum	  
being	  a	  common	  resource	  with	  competing	  public	  and	  private	  uses;	  
• ‘Public	  good’	  aspects	  of	  the	  media,	  including	  non-­‐rival	  and	  non-­‐excludable	  elements	  
of	  access	  and	  consumption;	  
• Tendencies	   toward	  monopoly	   or	   oligopoly	   in	   media	  markets,	   with	   resulting	   entry	  
barriers	  for	  new	  competitors	  and	  lack	  of	  content	  diversity;	  and	  
• Concerns	   about	   the	   potential	   relationship	   between	   economic	   power	   and	   political	  
power	   arising	   from	   concentration	   of	   ownership	   of	   the	   means	   of	   public	  
communication	  (Flew	  2011:	  63).	  
Reflecting	   these	   rationales	   of	   public	   interest	   intervention	   in	   the	  media	   space,	   states	   have	  
over	  the	  years	  developed	  different	  toolkits	  for	  regulating	  content.	  Some	  of	  the	  instruments	  
in	   this	   toolbox	  have	  been	  structural—directed	  at	   the	  structure	  of	  media	  organizations	  and	  
markets	   (such	   as	  media	  ownership	   regulation);	   others	   have	  been	  behavioral—	  directed	   at	  
the	  behavior	  of	  media	  outlets	  (such	  as	  restrictions	  on	  violence,	  sexuality	  and	  adult	  language,	  
as	  well	   as	  positive	  prescriptions	   for	   certain	   types	  of	   content	  with	  different	   culture-­‐specific	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While	  the	  paper	  does	  not	  question	  the	  public	  interest	  rationale	  for	  media	  regulation,	  some	  
of	  its	  thoughts	  on	  new	  media	  developments	  will	  admittedly	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  
existing	  means	   for	   achieving	   these	   goals,	   as	   it	   should	   not	   be	   forgotten	   that	   public	  media	  
were	  established	  and	  entrusted	  with	  specific	  objectives	  in	  a	  particular	  time	  period.	  That	  was	  
a	   time	  marked	  by	   analogue	   communications,	   spectrum	   scarcity,	   high	   entry	   costs	   and	   very	  
few	  media	  outlets—all	  conditions	  that	  have	  now	  been	  changed.	  An	  essential	  characteristic	  
of	   this	   ‘older’	   system	   to	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   is	   that	   it	   permitted	   centralized	   oversight	   and	  
control	  through	  a	  single	  point	  of	  entry.	  This	  control	  was	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  state.	  It	  was	  
embedded	   in	   the	   democratic	   mechanisms	   of	   the	   nation	   state	   and	   secured	   through	   a	  
complex	   network	   of	   institutions,	  which	   balanced	   the	   free	   flow	   of	   information	   against	   the	  
protection	   of	   other	   essential	   values	   and	   interests,	   such	   as	   privacy,	   national	   security	   and	  
public	  order	  (Keller	  2011).	  This	  too	  has	  changed,	  as	  the	  paper	  explains	  below.	  
It	   is	   equally	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   the	   international	   regimes	   related	   to	   content	   as	  
formulated	  during	   the	  analogue/offline	  age	  were	  nominal.	  They	   included	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  
soft	   law	   under	   the	  United	  Nations	   Educational	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Organization	   (UNESCO)	  
that	  endorsed	  some	  cultural	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sovereign	  right	  of	  states	  to	  
define	   their	   content	   policies;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	   had	   the	   ‘harder’	   rules	   on	   economic	  
globalization	   epitomized	   by	   the	   Agreements	   under	   the	  World	   Trade	   Organization	   (WTO),	  
which	  while	   liberalizing	  trade	   in	  goods	  and	  services,	  carved	  out	  policy	  space	  for	  the	  nation	  
state	  to	  regulate	  on	  essentially	  all	  aspects	  of	  content	  (Burri	  2009).	  The	  important	  exception	  
of	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  international	  harmonization	  was	  in	  the	  field	  of	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  
protection	  with	   the	  WTO	  Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐related	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (TRIPS)	  
and	   the	   suite	   of	   treaties	   under	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Organization	  (WIPO)	  (Dutfield	  and	  Suthersanen	  2008).	  
	  
ENTER	  THE	  WEB:	  FEATURES	  OF	  THE	  NEW	  MEDIA	  LANDSCAPE	  
Although	  television	  is	  still	  the	  number	  one	  media	  outlet	  for	  the	  average	  citizen	  on	  this	  globe,	  
very	   few	   would	   dispute	   that	   the	   media	   landscape	   has	   been	   utterly	   transformed	   by	   the	  
Internet.	   While	   the	   effects	   are	   not	   equally	   distributed	   across	   nations,	   generations	   and	  
classes	   (Palfrey	   and	   Gasser	   2008;	   Burri	   2012),	   the	   patterns	   of	   media	   use	   have	   been	  
profoundly	   modified	   (Naughton	   2006).	   Overall,	   we	   are	   faced	   with	   a	   decidedly	   different	  
information	  and	   communication	  environment	   (Benkler	   2006;	  Castells	   2009),	  which	   for	   the	  
sake	  of	  the	  present	  discussion	  can	  be	  identified	  by	  three	  key	  aspects:	  
(i) Abundance	  of	  content	  and	  its	  different	  organization	  (Weinberger	  2007,	  2012);	  
(ii) New	  ways	  of	  distributing,	  accessing	  and	  consuming	  content;	  and	  
(iii) New	  modes	  of	  content	  production,	  where	  the	  user	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  consumer	  but	  an	  
active	  creator	  (Benkler	  2006;	  Jenkins	  2006).	  
	  
One	  may	   reasonably	  wonder	  whether	  all	   these,	  often	   truly	   transformative,	   changes	  of	   the	  
media	  environment	  have	   inspired	  changes	   in	  the	  media	  policy	  toolkit	   too.	  Surprisingly,	   the	  
answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  negative:	  indeed,	  national	  media	  law	  and	  policy	  have	  only	  slightly	  
and	   not	   very	   innovatively	   adjusted	   to	   the	   affordances	   of	   the	   Internet	   and	   the	   societal	  
implications	  brought	  about	  with	  them	  (Burri	  2007).	  Neither	  has	  there	  been	  a	  conclusive	  and	  
evidence-­‐based	  analysis	  of	   the	  economic,	   cultural,	   social	  and	  political	   repercussions	  of	   the	  
new	  modes	  of	  content	  creation,	  distribution,	  access	  and	  consumption.	  In	  this	  regard,	  we	  are	  
still	  unsure	  whether	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  changes	  it	  triggers,	  as	  sketched	  earlier,	  contribute	  
to	  the	  intrinsic	  media	  policy	  objectives,	  such	  as	  pluralism	  of	   ideas	  and	  opinions,	  or	  actually	  
obstruct	  their	  attainment.	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After	  the	  original	  strong	  beliefs	  in	  the	  naturally	  generated	  diversity	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  ‘long	  
tail’	  theory;	  Anderson	  2006;	  Brynjolfsson	  et	  al.	  2006)	  and	  in	  the	  democratizing	  power	  of	  the	  
Internet	   (Goodman	  2004;	  Benkler	   2006:	   59–90),	   current	   practices	   seem	   to	  be	  much	  more	  
nuanced.	  As	   for	   the	   long	  tail,	  as	  Napoli	   summarizes,	   ‘it	  does	   indeed	  seem	  to	  be	  unclear	  at	  
this	  point	  whether	  a	  media	  environment	  of	  unprecedented	   choice	  and	   sophisticated	   tools	  
for	   identifying	   and	   accessing	   relevant	   content	   genuinely	   helps	   or	   hurts	   the	   prospects	   for	  
content	   that	   has	   not	   traditionally	   resided	   in	   the	   “head”’	   (Napoli	   2012).	   As	   global	   media	  
corporations	  merge,	  both	  horizontally	  and	  vertically,	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  better	  utilization	  of	  all	  
available	  channels	  and	  platforms,	  diversity	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  lost.	  While	  the	  positivism	  for	  user	  
creativity	   is	   still	   strong	   and	   its	   long-­‐term	   effects	   on	   legal	   modeling	   may	   be	   far-­‐reaching	  
(Benkler	  2006,	  2011),	  in	  the	  narrower	  sense	  of	  grassroots	  content	  production	  and	  its	  impact	  
on	  democratic	  discourse,	  sceptics	  have	  stressed	  the	  dangers	  of	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  public	  
discourse	   (van	   Alstyne	   and	   Brynjolfsson	   2004;	   Sunstein	   2007).	   The	   question	   of	   diversity	  
exposure	   is	   also	   vexed,	   as	   it	   appears	   that	   citizens’	   real	   consumption	   remains	   limited	   to	   a	  
handful	  of	  mainstream	  online	  sources	   that	  are	  as	  a	   rule	  professionally	  produced	  by	  white,	  
educated	  males	  (Hindman	  2009).	  	  
It	   is	   in	   this	   sense	   essential	   that	   a	   more	   careful,	   finer-­‐grained	   assessment	   emerges,	   and	  
research	  has	   a	   critical	   role	   to	   play	   in	   this	   regard.	   Policy	   adaptation	  needs	   to	   be	   evidence-­‐
driven	  as	  it	  may	  be	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  digital	  media	  hint	  at	  opportunities	  for	  better,	  more	  
efficient	  and	  flexible	  accommodation	  of	  public	  policy	  goals;	  in	  other	  cases,	  they	  may	  equally	  
be	   viewed	   as	   challenges,	   perhaps	   calling	   for	   additional	   regulatory	   intervention	   (Netanel	  
2000;	  Napoli	  2012).	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  adaptation,	  whatever	  its	  direction	  and	  form,	  is	  likely	  to	  
unfold	  in	  national	  regulatory	  domains.	  
Yet,	   the	  point	   this	  paper	   seeks	   to	  make	   is	   that	   content	   regulation	  under	   the	  conditions	  of	  
ubiquitous	   Internet	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   confined	   to	   national	  media	   law	   and	   policy,	   and	   one	  
needs	  to	  contemplate	  global	  design.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  because	  due	  to	  digitization	  and	  the	  
convergence	  of	  the	  media,	  telecommunications	  and	  the	  Information	  Technology	  (IT)	  sectors,	  
one	  ought	   to	   consider	   all	   layers	  of	   the	   communications	  model.1	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   content	  
layer	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  in	  isolation,	  as	  very	  often	  regulatory	  decisions	  taken	  at	  the	  physical	  
or	  logical	  layers	  matter	  for	  content.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  should	  be	  underscored	  that	  digital	  
technologies	   have	   had	   profound	   impact	   on	   governance	   forms,	   which	   depart	   from	   the	  
conventional	   notion	   of	   law	   and	   shift	   towards	   more	   complex,	   heterogeneous	   and	  
uncoordinated	  mechanisms,	  with	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	   involved.	  
One	  area	  that	  seems	  particularly	  important	  is	  the	  increasingly	  critical	  role	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  
means	   of	   control,	   existing	   on	   top	   of	   law	   or	   beyond	   law’s	   scope.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   raise	  
awareness	  of	  these	  new	  tools	  of	  content	  control	  and	  understand	  how	  they	  operate,	  so	  as	  to	  
be	  able	  to	  recognize	  the	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  information	  and	  find	  ways	  to	  cope	  with	  
them.	  
	  
TECHNOLOGIES	  OF	  CONTROL	  
Internet	  filtering	  
Internet	   filtering	   is	   the	  most	   commonly	  discussed	   technologically	  enabled	   form	  of	   control.	  
Although	  it	  has	  existed	  for	  quite	  some	  time	  now,	   it	  has	  evolved	  significantly	   in	  terms	  of	   its	  
scope	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  intervention,	  targets	  and	  methods.	  It	  is	  the	  reality	  now	  that,	  despite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  layered	  communications	  model	  is	  well	  established	  in	  the	  communications	  policy	  literature	  (e.g.	  
Benkler	  2000;	  Werbach	  2002;	  Goodman	  and	  Chen	  2010),	  although	  different	  interpretations	  exist.	  The	  
paper	   uses	   the	   three-­‐layered	   model,	   which	   consists	   of	   physical	   (the	   network	   plus	   the	   hardware	  
attached);	  the	  logical	  (software,	  applications,	  protocols)	  and	  the	  content	  layers.	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all	  the	  talk	  about	  the	  Internet’s	  ability	  to	  ‘route	  around’	  censorship,	  many	  governments	  (and	  
not	  only	  undemocratic	  ones)	  have	  proven	  adept	  at	  extending	  state	  control	  into	  cyberspace	  
for	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons,	   such	   as	   public	   morality,	   cultural	   integrity	   and	   political	   control	  
(Deibert	  et	  al.	  2008,	  2010,	  2011).	  
The	   manner	   of	   exercising	   control	   varies	   in	   practice.	   As	   Palfrey	   (2007:70)	   explains,	  
‘[s]ometimes	   the	   law	   bans	   citizens	   from	   performing	   a	   particular	   activity	   online,	   such	   as	  
accessing	   or	   publishing	   certain	   material.	   Sometimes	   the	   state	   takes	   control	   into	   its	   own	  
hands	  by	  erecting	  technological	  or	  other	  barriers	  within	  the	  state’s	  confines	  to	  stop	  the	  flow	  
of	   bits	   from	  one	   recipient	   to	   another.	   Increasingly,	   though,	   the	   state	   is	   turning	   to	   private	  
parties	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   online	   control.	   Often,	   those	   private	   parties	   are	   corporations	  
chartered	   locally	   or	   individual	   citizens	   who	   live	   in	   that	   jurisdiction’.	   As	   Palfrey	   further	  
explicates,	   it	   is	   now	   commonly	   the	   case	   that	   the	   state	   ‘requires	   private	   parties—often	  
intermediaries	  whose	  services	  connect	  one	  online	  actor	  to	  another—to	  participate	  in	  online	  
censorship	  and	  surveillance	  as	  a	  cost	  of	  doing	  business	  in	  that	  state’	  (Palfrey	  2007:	  70).	  	  
The	  evolutionary	  trajectory	  of	   Internet	  filtering	  is	  evident,	  moving	  towards	  more	  and	  more	  
sophisticated	   control	   mechanisms:	   from	   ‘open	   net’	   (from	   the	   Internet’s	   birth	   to	   2000)	  
through	  ‘access	  denied’	  (2000–2005),	  where	  crude	  filters	  and	  blocks	  were	  installed,	  towards	  
‘access	   controlled’	   (2005–2010),	   where	   mechanisms	   are	   multiple	   and	   varied,	   entering	   at	  
different	   points	   of	   control	   to	   limit	   access	   to	   knowledge	   and	   information	   (Palfrey	   2010;	  
Deibert	   et	   al.	   2011a:	   6–15).	   Before	   long,	   we	   have	   entered	   a	   fourth	   phase	   of	   ‘access	  
contested’,	  which	  is	  characterized	  by	  more,	  more	  diversified	  and	  deeper	  controls	  but	  also	  by	  
‘pushback	  against	  some	  of	  these	  controls	  from	  civil	  society,	  supported	  in	  many	  instances	  by	  
the	   resources	   of	   major	   governments,	   like	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   European	   Union’	  
(Deibert	  et	  al.	  2011a:	  14).	  	  
The	   repercussions	   of	   these	   ‘technologies	   of	   disconnection’	   (Dutton	   et	   al.	   2011:	   34)	   are	  
enormous	  for	  freedom	  of	  expression	  worldwide	  and	  put	  the	  democratizing	  potential	  of	  the	  
Internet—the	  ‘technologies	  of	  freedom’	  (de	  Sola	  Pool	  1983)	  in	  doubt.	  The	  ‘Great	  Firewall	  of	  
China’	   is	   the	   infamous	  example	  but	  we	  have	  also	  observed	   the	  developments	  of	   the	  Arab	  
spring,	   which	  more	   dynamically	   show	   the	   battles	   over	   the	   Internet	   as	   a	   critical	   space	   for	  
political	  action	  (Roberts	  et	  al.	  2011;	  2011a).	  The	  Snowden	  revelations	  have	  been	  the	  latest	  
instance	  exposing	   the	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	   intervention	  and	  the	  use	  made	  by	  states	  with	  
advanced	  democracies.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  conventional	  mechanisms	  of	  regulating	  media,	  Internet	  filtering	  as	  a	  powerful	  
method	   of	   exercising	   control	   is	   neither	   transparent,	   nor	   subject	   to	   mechanisms	   securing	  
legitimacy	  and	  accountability	   (McIntyre	  and	  Scott	  2008).	   It	   is	  different	  even	  from	  standard	  
surveillance	   methods,	   as	   applied	   by	   police	   enforcement,	   as	   Internet	   filtering	   is	   out	   of	  
judiciary	   control	   that	   may	   safeguard	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   citizens	   from	   violations	   of	   privacy,	  
freedom	   of	   speech	   or	   association.	   The	   trend	   of	   ‘outsourcing’	   the	   enforcement	   to	   private	  
entities,	  often	  as	  a	  precondition	  for	  doing	  business,	  is	  particularly	  worrisome.	  	  
	  
Digital	  rights	  management	  systems	  
Another	  mechanism	  to	  ensure	  perfect	  enforcement	  through	  technology	   is	   found	   in	  the	  so-­‐
called	  digital	   rights	  management	   systems	   (DRM).	  While	   Internet	   filtering	   is	   a	  practice	   that	  
can	   be	   done	   in	   many	   diverse	   ways	   (partial	   or	   full	   sites	   shutdown,	   distributed	   denial	   of	  
service,	   content	   filtering,	   cyber-­‐attacks,	   etc.;	   Deibert	   et	   al.	   2011a,	   Roberts	   et	   al.	   2011,	  
2011a),	   DRM	   is	   a	  means	   that	   can	   be	   employed	   for	   different	   practices.	   DRM	   have	  mostly	  
been	  discussed	   in	   the	   field	   of	   copyright	   enforcement,	   but	   they	  may	   in	   fact	   be	   utilized	   for	  
many	  other	  purposes	  as	  generic,	  embedded	   forms	   for	  controlling	  access	  and	  use	  of	  digital	  
content	  and	  devices.	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Although	  DRM	  are	  plainly	  technical	  applications,	  they	  are	  problematic	  in	  the	  field	  of	  media	  
policy	  as	  they	  may	  unduly	  restrict	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	  digital	  content.	  This	  has	  to	  do	  firstly	  
with	  the	  way	  copyright	  functions	  and	  secondly	  with	  the	  way	  DRM	  can	  automatically	  enforce	  
it.	  Copyright	  and	  other	  types	  of	  IP	  protection	  are	  intended	  to	  foster	  innovation	  by	  granting	  
authors	  a	  temporary	  monopoly	  over	  their	  creations.	  Copyright	  has	  built-­‐in	  mechanisms,	  such	  
as	   fair	   use,	   to	   ensure	   some	   balance	   between	   the	   individual	   rights	   of	   the	   authors	   and	   the	  
public	   interest	   (Helfer	   and	   Austin	   2011).	   This	   balance	   becomes	   very	   fragile	   in	   the	   digital	  
media	  environment,	  as	  companies	  seek	  perfect	  control	  over	   ‘their	  property’	  through	  DRM,	  
under	  the	  guise	  of	  protecting	  digital	  content	  from	  unlawful	  distribution	  and	  use.	  In	  practice,	  
such	   efforts	   have	   eroded	   some	   fundamental	   rights	   of	   consumers	   and	   restricted	   usages	  
traditionally	  allowed	  under	  analogue/offline	  copyright	  (Lucchi	  2007).	   In	  addition,	  DRM	  may	  
in	  many	  situations	  deter	  the	  full	  realization	  of	  digital	  content	  production	  and	  distribution,	  by	  
rendering	  it	  illegal	  or	  simply	  by	  banning	  it,	  possibly	  severely	  chilling	  creativity	  (Cohen	  2007;	  
Vaidhyanathan	  2007).	  
In	  terms	  of	  regulation	  and	  its	  evolution,	   it	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  content	  industries	  
have	  been	  very	  successful	   in	   their	  efforts	   to	  expand	  the	  scope	  and	  extend	   the	  duration	  of	  
copyright.	   Through	   race-­‐to-­‐the-­‐top	   strategies,	   this	   augmented	   protection	   has	   been	  
emancipated	   to	   the	   international	   level	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement,	   as	  
mentioned	  earlier,	  and	  in	  the	  even	  further-­‐reaching	  free	  trade	  agreements	  (FTAs)	  (Netanel	  
2007;	  Patry	  2009).	  	  
Despite	  grassroots	  activism,	   IP	   issues	  have	   remained	  only	  marginal	   in	  key	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  
securing	  public	  goods	  at	  the	  international	  level	  (Helfer	  and	  Austin	  2011).	  For	  instance,	  they	  
do	  not	  appear	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way	  in	  the	  2005	  UNESCO	  Convention	  on	  the	  Protection	  and	  
Promotion	  of	  the	  Diversity	  of	  Cultural	  Expressions	  (Burri	  2009,	  2010),	  nor	  do	  they	  figure	  in	  
the	  World	  Summit	  on	  the	  Information	  Society	  (WSIS)	  agenda	  (Ermert	  2005)	  or	  in	  the	  recent	  
NetMundial	   documents.2 	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   circumvention	   of	   technical	   protection	  
measures,	  such	  as	  DRM,	  has	  been	  prohibited	  in	  most	  jurisdictions,	  as	  well	  as	  internationally,	  
through	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties.3	  	  
The	  proposed	  SOPA/PIPA	   legislation,4	  which	   in	  essence	  aimed	  to	  expand	  the	  ability	  of	  U.S.	  
law	  enforcement	   to	   fight	  online	   trafficking,	   also	  beyond	   the	  U.S.	  national	   jurisdiction,	  was	  
one	  of	  the	  recent	  instances	  of	  sought	  expansion	  of	  state	  control.	  The	  anticipated	  dangers	  of	  
silencing	  of	  speech,	  chilling	  innovation	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  for	  the	  Internet	  itself	  need	  to	  be	  
clearly	  acknowledged	  (Lemley,	  Levine	  and	  Post	  2012).	  
DRM	  have	  repercussions	  beyond	  copyright	  and	  its	  problematic	  interface	  with	  citizens’	  rights.	  
The	   DRM	   mechanisms	   are	   not	   transparent	   and	   in	   fact	   may	   allow	   for	   any	   type	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  http://netmundial.br/netmundial-­‐multistakeholder-­‐statement/	  
3	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  anti-­‐circumvention	  is	  banned	  by	  the	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  105-­‐
304,	   112	   Stat.	   2860	   (1998)	   (codified	   as	   amended	   in	   scattered	   sections	  of	   17	  U.S.C.);	   in	   the	  EU,	   the	  
relevant	  act	  is	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  22	  May	  2001	  on	  
the	  harmonisation	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	   in	  the	   information	  society,	  OJ	  L	  
167/10,	   22	   June	   2001.	  On	  DRM,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Yu	   (2006);	  Wheatley	   (2008).	   The	  WIPO	  Copyright	   Treaty	  
(WCT)	   and	   the	   WIPO	   Performances	   and	   Phonograms	   Treaty	   (WPPT)	   were	   concluded	   in	   1996	   and	  
entered	  into	  force	  in	  2002.	  
4	  Stop	   Online	   Piracy	   Act	   (SOPA),	   H.R.	   3261	   and	   Protect	   IP	   Act	   (Preventing	   Real	   Online	   Threats	   to	  
Economic	  Creativity	   and	  Theft	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	  Act,	   or	   PIPA),	   S.	   968.	  An	  essential	   difference	  
between	   the	   two	   is	   that	   PIPA	   targets	   domain	   name	   system	   providers,	   financial	   companies	   and	  
advertising	  networks,	  but	  not	  companies	  that	  provide	   Internet	  connectivity.	  After	  strong	  opposition	  
by	   academics,	   corporations	   and	   civil	   society	   representatives	   (see	   e.g.	  
https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-­‐internet-­‐censorship-­‐and-­‐copyright-­‐bill),	  both	  bills	  were	  dropped.	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interference,	   impacting	  on	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  person	  reading	  an	  e-­‐book,	  or	  watching	  a	  film	  
on	   iTunes;	   they	   may	   deprive	   the	   individual	   from	   making	   choices	   between	   products	   or	  
services	   (Lessig	  1999)	  or	   influence	   future	  commercial	  offers,	   turning	   (symbolically	  put)	   the	  
user	   into	   a	   product.	   Ultimately,	   DRM-­‐like	   systems	   can	   enforce	   any	   rule	   that	   content	   or	  
device	  producers	  want	  (Zittrain	  2008a),	  such	  as	  for	  instance	  making	  access	  conditional	  on	  a	  
payment.	   Such	   developments	   are	   aligned	   with	   the	   broader	   trend	   of	   the	   privatization	   of	  
content	  (Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  2002)	  rather	  than	  its	  democratization.	  Privileged	  access	  to	  
scientific	  data	  and	  knowledge,	  entertainment,	  news	  and	  archives	  creates	  a	  deep	  divide,	  with	  
various	  implications,	  between	  those	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  pay	  and	  those	  who	  cannot.	  	  
In	   the	   discussions	   of	   net	   neutrality	   (Marsden	   2010)	   and	   search	   engines	   (Vaidhyanathan	  
2007),	   one	   can	   also	   see	   elements	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   two-­‐tier	   environments,	   where	   in	  
exchange	   for	   additional	   payment,	   one	   gets	   either	   faster	   access	   to	   data	   and	   traffic,	   or	  
becomes	  more	  visible	  on	   the	  web.	  These	  different	  modalities	  are	  enabled	  by	   the	  different	  
type	  of	  architecture	  in	  cyberspace.	  	  
	  
Technology	  as	  regulation	  
The	  above	  cases	  fit	   into	  Lawrence	  Lessig’s	  broader	  narrative	  of	   ‘code	   is	   law’.	  Lessig	  argued	  
that	  in	  cyberspace,	  code	  is	  overtaking	  the	  functions	  of	  law	  (Lessig	  1999,	  2006).	  In	  contrast	  to	  
real-­‐space,	  where	  architecture	  is	  more	  or	  less	  given,	  in	  cyberspace,	  it	  is	  ‘plastic’	  and	  open	  to	  
change	  (Lessig	  2006:	  20).	  Designing	  cyberspace	  through	  code	  thus	  becomes	  a	  very	  powerful	  
regulatory	  activity	  (Lessig	  2006:	  32).	  This	  code,	  which	  Lessig	  calls	  ‘West	  Coast	  Code’	  (because	  
of	  the	  proximity	  to	  Silicon	  Valley),	  is	  starkly	  different	  from	  the	  ‘East	  Coast	  Code’	  (so-­‐named	  
because	  of	  the	  proximity	  to	  Washington,	  DC	  [Lessig	  2006:	  72]).	  The	  latter	  encompasses	  laws	  
as	  a	  product	  of	   the	  conventional	   legislative	  processes,	  which	   in	  a	  democratic	   state	   involve	  
highly	   formalized	   and	   complex	   mechanisms	   and	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   system	   of	   checks	   and	  
balances.	  Traditional	  media	  law-­‐making,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  rules	  and	  the	  institutions	  that	  
are	   created,	   is	   precisely	   the	   product	   of	   such	   a	   deliberative	   process;	   these	   rules	   are	   also	  
transparent,	  may	  be	  discussed,	  criticized,	  opposed	  to	  and	  as	  a	  result	  perhaps	  modified.	  The	  
U.S.	  First	  Amendment	  case	  law,	  for	  instance,	  is	  a	  strong	  proof	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  testing	  new	  
media	  and	  the	  ways	  to	  regulate	  them	  against	  the	  high	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  (see,	  
e.g.,	  Bellia	  et	  al.	  2007).5	  
‘West	   Coast	   Code,’	   by	   contrast,	   is	   simply	   built	   into	   the	   hardware	   or	   the	   software;	   it	   is	  
cheaper	  and	  faster	  to	  create	  but	  also	  opaque	  for	  citizens.	  In	  comparison	  to	  conventional	  law,	  
it	   is	   also	   self-­‐enforceable,	   without	   executive	   or	   judicial	   oversight	   (Zittrain	   2008a).	   While	  
West	  Coast	  Code	  may	  be	  an	  appropriate	  (and	  more	  economical)	  mechanism	  to	  address	  the	  
pertinent	   specific	   and	   highly	   technical	   questions	   as	   it	   ‘industrializes’	   content	   surveillance,	  
classification,	   and	   management	   (Mueller	   2010:	   188).	   But	   it	   lacks	   the	   legitimacy	   and	  
accountability	   of	   conventional	   law-­‐making	   (Koops	   2008).	   In	   addition,	  while	   such	   code	   can	  
cater	   for	  some	  narrow	  policy	  goals,	  such	  as	  protecting	  against	  unlawful	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  
works,	  it	  cannot	  address	  broader	  and	  much	  more	  complex	  objectives	  that	  involve	  a	  balance	  
between	  different	  private	  and	  public	  interests.	  
The	  experience	  gained	  over	  the	  last	  15	  years,	  when	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  Code	  and	  Other	  Laws	  
of	  Cyberspace	  was	  published,	  has	  confirmed	  Lessig’s	  theory	  and	  the	  move	  from	  law	  towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See,	  e.g.,	  Home	  Box	  Office,	   Inc.	  v.	  FCC,	  567	  F.2d	  9,	  68	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1977),	  where	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  
‘important	  differences	  between	  cable	  and	  broadcast	  television	  and	  “differences	  in	  the	  characteristics	  
of	  new	  media	  justify	  differences	  in	  the	  First	  Amendment	  standards	  applied	  to	  them”’	  (citing	  Red	  Lion	  
Broadcasting	  Co.	  v.	  FCC,	  395	  U.S.	  367,	  386,	  389	  (1969),	  which	  upheld	  the	  fairness	  doctrine	  on	  grounds	  
that	  it	  implemented	  the	  First	  Amendment).	  See	  also	  Price	  (2001).	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code	   in	   creating	  mechanisms	   of	   control	   in	   cyberspace.	   The	   situation	   has	   in	  many	   aspects	  
only	  worsened	  (Lessig	  2006;	  Zittrain	  2008).	  Indeed,	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  deterioration	  of	  some	  
principles	  that	  initially	  allowed	  innovation	  over	  the	  network	  and	  have	  been	  enshrined	  in	  law.	  
A	   key	   such	   principle	   existing	   in	   most	   telecommunications	   laws	   immunized	   the	   carriers,	  
whether	   broadband	   companies	   or	   Internet	   Service	   Providers	   (ISPs),	   for	   objectionable	  
material	   that	   flows	   through	   their	   channels.6	  This	   rule	   permitted	  media	   access	   by	   ordinary	  
individuals,	   and	   as	  Balkin	   argues,	   ‘…	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   practical	   effects,	   it	  may	  be	  even	  more	  
important	   than	  many	  aspects	  of	  First	  Amendment	  doctrine’	   (Balkin	  2008:	  111).	  The	  DMCA	  
further	  limited	  the	  liability	  of	  ISPs	  for	  copyright	  infringements,	  asking	  them	  to	  react	  only	  ex	  
post	   to	   takedown	   notices. 7 	  Although	   the	   safe	   harbor	   rule	   as	   privately	   administered	  
enforcement	  may	  have	  had	  some	  chilling	  effects	  on	   Internet	  speech	   (Seltzer	  2010),	   it	  may	  
have	  had	  positive	   impact	   too,	  as	   it	   shielded	   intermediaries.	  Balkin	  believes	  that,	   ‘[w]ithout	  
these	   safe	   harbor	   provisions,	   many	   features	   of	   current	   Internet	   practice—including	   the	  
development	   of	   Web	   2.0	   applications	   that	   leverage	   the	   content	   contributions	   of	   many	  
people—would	   be	   legally	   risky.	   Indeed,	   were	   it	   not	   for	   statutory	   safe	   harbors	   and	   other	  
limits	  on	   copyright	   liability,	   the	  basic	  practices	  of	   search	  engines,	   and	   indeed	  much	  of	   the	  
traffic	  on	  the	  Internet,	  might	  be	  illegal’	  (Balkin	  2008:	  111).	  	  
Over	  time,	  however,	  some	  of	  these	   important	   foundational	  principles	  have	  deteriorated	   in	  
practice.	  For	  example,	  most	   industrialized	  countries	  have	  severely	   limited	  safe	  harbors	  and	  
reconsidered	   intermediaries’	   responsibilities	   in	   copyright	   enforcement	   demanding	   their	  
active	  ex	  ante	   involvement	   in	  order	   to	  escape	   liability	   (de	  Beer	  and	  Clemmer	  2009).	  8	  One	  
can	  observe	  a	  shift	  from	  ‘passive-­‐reactive	  to	  active-­‐preventive	  schemes	  for	  communication	  
intermediaries’	   (de	   Beer	   and	   Clemmer	   2009:	   24)	   and	   to	   a	   new	   type	   of	   content	   filtering	  
enabled	   through	   the	   ‘deep	   packet	   inspection’	   technology,	   which	   may	   further	   erode	  
important	   users’	   rights	   (Katyal	   2010;	   Bendrath	   and	  Mueller	   2012).	  Overall,	   the	   critical	   net	  
neutrality	  principle,	  which	  has	  been	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  architecture	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  
Internet	  and	  basically	  holds	  that	  the	  network	  should	  be	  neutral	  to	  the	  content	  being	  passed	  
and	   that	   the	   intelligence	   is	   located	   at	   the	   edges	   of	   the	   network	   (Wu	   2003)	   has	   been	  
punctuated.	  While	  there	  is	  increasingly	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  net	  neutrality	  
as	  an	  architectural	  foundation	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  innovation	  and	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  content,	  the	  
international	  community	  could	  not	  reach	  consensus	  on	  the	  principle	  and	  enshrine	   it	   in	  the	  
NetMundial	  Multistakeholder	  Documents.9	  
	  
CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
In	   presenting	   the	   above	   trends,	   the	   paper’s	   prime	   aim	   was	   to	   illustrate	   that	   in	   the	   new	  
media	   space	   there	   are	   multiple	   and	   increasing	   points	   of	   control	   outside	   formal	   legal	  
institutions	   and	   outside	   the	   conventional	   scope	   of	   media	   policy.	   The	   complex	   and	   highly	  
fragmented	   nature	   of	   governance,	   which	   often	   mobilizes	   intermediaries	   (Verhulst	   2006;	  
Mueller	   2010:	   205),	   threatens	   free	   speech	   and	   makes	   in	   general	   the	   pursuit	   of	   public	  
objectives	  difficult.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Telecommunications	   Act	   of	   1996,	   Pub.	   L.	   No.	   104-­‐104,	   110	   Stat.	   56	   (codified	   as	   amended	   in	  
scattered	  sections	  of	  47	  U.S.C.).	  
7 	  ISPs	   taking	   care	   of	   traffic	   only	   were	   not	   responsible	   for	   copyright	   violations	   over	   their	  
communication	  channels,	  as	   long	  as	   the	   ISPs	  terminated	  repeat	   infringers	   (17	  USC	  §	  512(a)	   (2000)).	  
Intermediaries	  that	  hosted	  content	  had	  more	  responsibility,	  and	  were	  safe	  only	   if	  they	  acted	  swiftly	  
to	  take	  down	  infringing	  material	  once	  they	  were	  notified	  of	  the	  infringement.	  
8	  The	   countries	   examined	   in	   this	   study	   were	   Australia,	   Canada,	   China,	   the	   EU,	   France,	   Germany,	  
Japan,	  New	  Zealand,	  Singapore,	  South	  Korea,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
9	  http://netmundial.br/netmundial-­‐multistakeholder-­‐statement/	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We	  stressed	  in	  particular	  the	  increasing	  role	  of	  technologically-­‐enabled	  control.	  We	  showed	  
that	  it	  can	  effectively	  (and	  efficiently)	  influence	  the	  production	  and	  the	  flow	  of	  information,	  
access	  to	   information,	   its	  consumption	  and	  reuse.	  Technology	  strongly	   influences	  both	  the	  
interactions	  within	  the	  media	  environment	  that	  are	  to	  be	  regulated	  (that	   is,	   the	  subject	  of	  
regulation),	   and	   on	   its	   regulability	   (that	   is,	   the	   possibilities	   and	   conditions	   of	   regulation).	  
Technological	   design	   can	   in	   itself	   ‘be	  more	   or	   less	   free	   speech	   friendly,	   and	  more	   or	   less	  
participatory’	   (Balkin	   2008:	   110)	   –	   the	   current	   trends	   show	   rather	   the	   constraining	   rather	  
than	  the	  enabling	  opportunities.	  
The	   perils	   of	   technologically-­‐based	   regulation	   are	   all	   the	   greater	   if	   we	   bear	   in	   mind	   that	  
there	   is	  still	  so	  much	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  digital	  media	  environment	  on	  the	  
intrinsic	   goals	   of	   media	   policy	   and	   how	   it	   affects	   the	   ‘ecology	   of	   freedom	   of	   expression’	  
(Dutton	   et	   al.	   2011:	   5).	   This	   uncertainty	   is	   not	   fully	   acknowledged,	   and	   regulators	   do	   not	  
hesitate	   to	   intervene,	  mostly	   in	   the	   IP	   field,	   often	   ignoring	   the	  multidirectional	   effects	   of	  
their	  action,	  and	  having	  lost	  the	  caution	  and	  the	  lightness	  of	  touch	  of	  the	  early	  Internet	  days.	  
The	   overall	   danger	   of	   unintended	   consequences	   is	   augmented	   by	   increased	   policy	  
interdependence	  and	  the	  prevalent	  messy	  governance	  structures.	  In	  fact,	  digital	  media	  only	  
accentuate	  globalness	  and	  interdependence,	  as	   local	  decisions	  have	  global	   impact	  and	  vice	  
versa.	  
	  
RECOMMENDATIONS	  FOR	  APT	  DESIGN	  FOR	  THE	  REGULATION	  OF	  INTERNET	  CONTENT	  
Against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   above	   analysis,	   we	   would	   like	   to	   put	   forward	   a	   few	  
recommendations	   that	   address	   issues	   critical	   for	   the	   evolving	   design	   of	   Internet	   content	  
regulation.	  
While	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  both	  as	  a	  passive	  and	  an	  active	  right,	   is	  protected	  under	  
public	   international	   law,10	  there	  are	  no	   commonly	  agreed	   international	   standards	  as	   to	   its	  
implementation	   and	   state	   practice	   varies.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Internet,	   as	   the	   paper	  
showed	  above,	  both	  accentuates	   the	   importance	  of	   local	  decisions,	  as	  well	   as	  enables	   the	  
state	   to	  mobilize	   newer	   forms	   of	   controlling	   content,	   in	   particular	   through	   intermediaries	  	  
and	  technological	  design.	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  while	  we	  do	  not	  envision	  a	  globally	  harmonized	  system	  of	  content	  regulation,	  
we	   deem	   it	   crucial	   that	   at	   least	   two	   governance	   elements	   are	   addressed	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  
global	  action	  –	  (i)	  constraining	  the	  practice	  of	  content	  filtering	  and	  (ii)	  commitment	  to	  the	  
net	  neutrality	  principle.	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  former,	  while	   it	   is	   important	  how	  well	  and	  as	  fairly	  as	  possible	  Internet	  
filtering	  is	  done	  (Bambauer	  2009),	  as	  Mueller	  points	  out	  our	  underlying	  wish	  should	  be	  not	  
to	  optimize	  filtering	  but	  rather	  to	  resist	   it	   (Mueller	  2010:	  207).	  Whereas	  and	  as	  clarified	  at	  
the	  paper’s	  outset,	   there	  are	  valid	  concerns	   that	  may	   justify	  state	   intervention,	   the	  nation	  
state	   should	   exercise	   restrain	   in	   content	   policing	   and	   when	   necessary,	   base	   it	   on	   clear,	  
transparent	   criteria	   and	   due	   process.	   The	   dangers	   of	   outsourcing	   content	   regulation	   to	  
private	  actors	  and/or	  embedding	  it	  in	  code	  should	  be	  clearly	  acknowledged	  and	  the	  practice	  
equally	  restrained	  (Mueller	  2010:	  211).	  States	  should	  strive	  to	  rely	  on	  notice	  and	  takedown	  
as	   an	   ex	   post	   method	   of	   addressing	   illegal	   content	   and	   do	   this	   exclusively	   within	   the	  
parameters	   of	   their	   own	   jurisdiction,	   abstaining	   from	   extra-­‐territorial	   action,	   which	   may	  
interfere	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  network	  (Mueller	  2010:	  207).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Art.	  19	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights;	  art.	  19	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  
and	  Political	  Rights,	  as	  well	  as	  art.	  10	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms.	  
	   9	  
Furthermore,	   ‘[t]he	   governance	   of	   the	   Internet	   needs	   to	   explicitly	   recognize	   and	   embrace	  
the	  principle	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  national	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  flow	  of	  information.	  This	  
claim	   is	   based	   on	   the	   truth	   that	   there	   are	   many	   transnational	   communities	   or	   policies,	  
created	   by	   global	   electronic	   communications,	   whose	   individual	   members	   have	   their	   own	  
intrinsic	  rights	  to	  communicate	  among	  themselves’	  (Mueller	  2010:	  209).	  
With	   regard	   to	  net	  neutrality,	   states,	   the	   international	   community	  and	   civil	   society	   should	  
strive	  to	  enshrine	  this	  principle,	  as	  broadly	  conceived	  (Marsden	  2010),	  as	  a	  global	  norm,	  at	  
least	  in	  a	  soft	  law	  form.	  A	  network	  that	  is	  neutral	  has	  so	  far	  permitted	  incredible	  amount	  of	  
creativity	   and	   innovation	   and	  does	   in	   effect	   eliminate	   gatekeepers	   and	  diverse	  barriers	   to	  
access:	   ‘A	  neutral	   network	  maximizes	   access	   to	   the	  public	   and	  minimizes	   the	   ability	   of	   an	  
intermediary	  to	  substitute	  its	  own	  judgments	  for	  those	  of	  end	  users’	  (Mueller	  2010:	  210).	  
States	  should	  not	  only	  rhetorically	  commit	  to	  net	  neutrality	  but	  implement	  it	  in	  effect.	  This	  
may	   affect	   a	   number	   of	   policies	   and	   overall	   regulatory	   design,	   as	  we	   showed	   above.	   This	  
implementation	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   serious	   implications	   to	   filtering	   practices	   and	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   involved	   private	   actors	   and	   state	   agencies.	   It	   should	   also	   affect	  
policies	  in	  the	  field	  of	  copyright	  enforcement	  and	  solutions	  in	  multilateral	  and	  regional	  trade	  
venues,	  which	  at	  first	  sight	  appear	  less	  directly	  linked	  to	  content	  regulation	  (Burri	  2013).	  
Overall,	   states	   should	   strive	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   deferential	   principle	   of	   respecting	   the	  
functional	   integrity	   of	   the	   Internet,	   and	   combine	   this	   with	   appropriate	   institutional	   and	  
organizational	   implements,	  which	  can	  ultimately	   ‘help	  ensure	  that	  any	  potential	  regulation	  
of	  Internet-­‐based	  activities	  enables,	  rather	  than	  hinders,	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  benefits	  for	  
end	   users’	   (Whitt	   2013:	   689).	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   design	   of	   this	   distributed	   governance	  
architecture	   in	  a	   ‘shared	  environment’	   (Cerf	  et	  al.	  2014)	   is	  hard	   to	  pinpoint	  and	   there	   is	  a	  
need	  for	  more	  research	  that	  maps	  existing	  models	  in	  different	  regimes	  seeking	  apt	  solutions,	  
as	   well	   as	   maps	   power	   relations	   in	   different	   institutional	   settings,	   which	   are	   ultimately	  
important	  for	  the	  feasibility	  of	  any	  proposed	  design.	  	  
Finally,	   while	   states	   grapple	   to	   formulate	   their	   coherent	   roles	   in	   the	   broad	   Internet	  
governance	   landscape,	   they	   should	   subscribe	   to	   the	   ‘do	   no	   harm’	   principle.	   In	   this	   sense,	  
policy-­‐makers	  should	  not	  adopt	  regulations	  that	  violate	  the	  Internet’s	  modular,	  end-­‐to-­‐end,	  
interconnected	  and	  agnostic	  nature	  and	  give	  way	  to	  the	  comparative	  wisdom	  and	  efficacy	  of	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